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Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It), 
Elizabeth Anderson. Princeton University Press, 2017, xxiii + 196 pages. 
 
Governments in many countries have often been authoritarian, controlled by individuals with 
the authority to command others and impose sanctions but unaccountable to those subjected to 
them. In many societies, citizens have fought to gradually democratise their government and 
abolish unaccountable authority. They secured political equality and prevented the most 
extreme forms of abuse and domination by establishing political and civil rights, they 
designed systems of checks and balances to hold government officials accountable, and they 
incentivised them to promote the public interest through universal suffrage.  
In Private Government, Elizabeth Anderson proposes to extend these democratic 
ideals and institutional safeguards to the government of economic organisations. She 
contributes to a long and growing tradition of authors and active citizens in favour of 
democratic reforms in the economy, making the authority in workplaces accountable to 
workers and more responsive to their interests. Anderson illustrates employers’ authority and 
capacity to rule workers’ lives with troubling examples such as Walmart employees who are 
prohibited from exchanging casual remarks in order to avoid ‘time theft’ or Tyson’s 
humiliating policy preventing its poultry workers from using the bathroom (xix). Drawing an 
analogy between states and firms, she suggests that if unaccountable authority is morally 
objectionable within states, it should also be morally objectionable within firms (xix).  
A common objection – which can be called the ‘libertarian’ objection – consists in 
arguing that, contrary to our relations with the state, employment relations are not problematic 
because they result from free contracts on the market and economic organisations do not have 
any authority over workers since they remain free to exit the organisation whenever they 
want. Therefore, while limiting the power of state governments is justified, regulating free 
market transactions constitutes an illegitimate infringement on individual freedom. Anderson 
claims that we are ill-equipped to reply to this libertarian objection: ‘We have the language of 
fairness and distributive justice to talk about low wages and inadequate benefits… But we 
don’t have good ways to talk about the way bosses rule workers’ lives’ (xix-xx).  
Anderson’s Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton University in 2015 – published in 
this volume along with comments by Ann Hughes, David Bromwich, Niko Kolodny, and 
Tyler Cowen – aim at answering the libertarian objection in two steps. In the first lecture, 
Anderson intends to demonstrate why the belief that individual freedom and free markets 
always go hand in hand is misguided. Early defenders of a free market may have had good 
reasons to believe that it would promote the freedom and independence of small proprietors’ 
and put everyone on an equal footing. But the industrial revolution saw the rise of large 
organisations in which employers have a considerable and unaccountable authority over 
workers. As a result, Anderson argues in the second lecture that we need a language to think 
about how bosses rule workers’ life. She proposes to think of firms as forms of ‘private 
governments’ unaccountable to the people they govern. She argues that their authority should 
be subjected to democratic safeguards similar to the ones expected in states such as the rule of 
law, substantive constitutional rights, and forms of representation giving a voice to the 
governed. In what follows, I summarise and discuss each of these two lectures. I conclude that 
further arguments are needed to justify Anderson’s most ambitious democratic proposals. 
 
1. FIRST LECTURE: WHEN THE MARKET WAS ‘LEFT’ 
In the first lecture, Anderson provides an insightful excursion into the history of economic 
thought in order to explain the original appeal of free market ideals. Early modern England, as 
she underlines, ‘was characterized by pervasive hierarchies of domination and subordination’ 
(8). The King’s authority over all property meant that customary property rights could be 
extinguished by law, leading to expulsions and expropriations. State monopolies, granted to 
cartels of merchants, along with tariffs and other mercantilist barriers to trade also threatened 
the independence of small traders and artisans, and reduced workers’ self-employment 
opportunities and bargaining power (14-15). In this context, the Levellers of the English Civil 
War – most remembered for their constitutional demands to limit the power of the King, lords 
and parliament – and, later, authors like John Locke, and Adam Smith saw private property 
rights and free markets as tools to realise a ‘free society of equals’ (7-8). They envisioned the 
rise of small proprietors and small-scale enterprises run by independent artisans and 
merchants, able to make a living and to exchange goods on an equal footing (21).  
As Ann Hughes notes in her comment (75-88), the reality of the economy in early 
modern England was more complex and far from the ideal envisioned by these authors. The 
burgeoning market order created inequalities and social polarisation and a large portion of the 
population often depended on public assistance. Yet, this does not undermine the validity of 
these authors’ innovative idea that private property rights and free markets were necessary – if 
not sufficient – institutions to protect the freedom and independence of individuals. They even 
had good reasons to hope that – under the conditions they envisioned – free markets would 
increase individuals’ freedom and promote equal status and standing (22). 
The Industrial Revolution revealed that private property rights and free markets were 
not sufficient to secure individuals’ freedom and protection from domination. Benefiting from 
economies of scale – as well as market failures such as high entry barriers in capital-intensive 
industries – economic organisations became large authoritarian hierarchies centralising 
production to the detriment of small-scale producers and self-employment opportunities (33). 
Workers’ freedom, independence, and bargaining power decreased as the cost to exit 
exploitative workplaces increased and working conditions severely deteriorated (33-36). 
Anderson concludes that, in this new social context, the libertarian belief that individual 
freedom and unregulated markets always go hand in hand is mistaken. This calls for a 
language to think about how bosses dominate workers.  
I think that this first lecture illuminates contemporary debates about freedom and 
markets and can foster understanding between left and right. Anderson explains the original 
appeal of libertarian, free market ideals to the ones on ‘the left’ who may sometimes disregard 
them too quickly. She also attempts to explain to those with ‘right’-libertarian sympathies 
why their own values of freedom and independence are threatened by authoritarian 
organisations and their categorical opposition to market regulations and labour protections. In 
a world often divided along ideological lines, I think that Anderson’s attempt at restoring 
mutual understanding should be saluted and emulated. 
 
2. SECOND LECTURE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 
In the second lecture, Anderson proposes to think of firms as forms of ‘private governments’. 
According to her, ‘government exists whenever some have the authority to issue orders to 
others, backed by sanctions’ (42). Government can happen everywhere, not only at the level 
of the state, but also in firms, churches or families. Whether governments are ‘public’ or 
‘private’ depends on whether they are accountable or not to the people they govern (43). State 
governments became public – instead of private – through gradual democratic reforms 
making their action more transparent and accountable to every citizen (44). However, she 
claims that most workplaces, in the United States at least, remain under the rule of private 
governments with substantial, unaccountable authority over the workers they govern (39).  
Anderson’s central argument stresses that both states’ and firms’ governments can 
threaten various aspects of individuals’ freedom: their negative freedom from legal 
constraints, their positive freedom to pursue their projects, and their republican freedom from 
the domination of others. However, against libertarians, Anderson argues that state-enforced 
restrictions of negative freedom can be justified if they increase individuals’ freedom in other 
respects. For instance, regulating employers’ authority over workers and their capacity to 
impose sanctions for off-duty behaviour may restrict their negative freedom, but it can 
increase workers’ positive or republican freedom (45-48). Therefore, if our goal is to promote 
individuals’ overall freedom, state regulations can be justified when they free workers from 
firms’ unaccountable authority. Anderson concludes by proposing four strategies do so. States 
should intervene to (1.) improve workers’ freedom of exit; moreover, they should make sure 
that firms’ governments are subjected to democratic safeguards similar to the ones expected in 
states such as a (2.) the rule of law, (3.) substantive constitutional rights, and (4.) forms of 
representation giving a voice to workers in their workplace (65-71).  
 
3. FURTHER ARGUMENTS ARE NEEDED TO JUSTIFY ANDERSONS’ MOST 
AMBITIOUS PROPOSALS 
My comments focus on Anderson’s central argument. While I share her conviction that states 
should intervene to democratise firms and make their government accountable to workers, 
Anderson’s claims in Private Government are not sufficient to justify some of the most 
ambitious democratic reforms that she envisions such as (4.) democratic representation within 
workplaces. The four following claims explain why: a. negative freedom should be protected, 
b. restricting negative freedom is justified only if necessary to improve the distribution of 
overall freedom, c. democratic reforms within firms may not be necessary to improve the 
distribution of overall freedom, and d. these democratic reforms cannot be justified on 
relational egalitarian grounds. I conclude that further arguments are needed to justify 
Anderson’s most ambitious democratic proposals. Let me discuss each claim in turn. 
a. Negative freedom should be protected. Anderson rightly argues that if our goal is 
to promote individuals’ overall freedom, negative freedom should not be our only concern. 
Freedom can be defined as the capacity of an agent to realise a choice without constraint 
(MacCallum 1967: 314). The capacity of the agent (what Anderson calls ‘positive freedom’) 
depends on individuals’ external resources, such as income and wealth, and internal resources, 
such as health. Potential constraints include legal constraints (‘negative freedom’) and non-
legal constraints such as the domination of others (‘republican freedom’) (45). This means 
that negative freedom denotes nothing else but a subset of our overall freedom: it is merely 
the degree of legal constraint to which we are subjected. But, or course, this does not mean 
that negative freedom should not be protected at all. 
State-enforced market regulations restricting negative freedom can be justified if they 
sufficiently increase the freedom of workers in other respects, i.e. their positive or republican 
freedom (46-48). However, it remains reasonable to think that state authorities should respect 
what John Rawls calls a general presumption of formal freedom or, in his words, a 
‘presumption against imposing legal and other restrictions on conduct without sufficient 
reason’ (1993: 292). Among two sets of policies producing identical distributions of positive 
and republican freedom, authorities should surely choose the one restricting negative freedom 
the least. A presumption of formal freedom thus prevents unnecessary legal restrictions.  
b. Restricting negative freedom is justified only if necessary to improve the 
distribution of overall freedom. Why this raises a problem for Anderson’s argument will 
become clear in the following example. Suppose that a democratic state government wants to 
implement an economic system that improves the distribution of overall freedom. As Rawls 
points out, we need to evaluate the system as a whole, not each of its parts in isolation: ‘an 
institution may be unjust although the social system as a whole is not’ for instance if ‘within 
the structure of an institution or social system one apparent injustice compensates for another’ 
(1971: 57). With this in mind, suppose that two systems produce an identical distribution of 
positive and republican freedom. One abolishes firms’ private governments by making 
workplace authority accountable to workers. The second tolerates private governments within 
firms, but restores workers’ positive and republican freedom by implementing a range of 
other policies such as redistributive tax-and-transfer schemes, support to unions, investments 
in social services, and so on. At first sight, there seems to be no way to choose between the 
two systems. However, suppose that the first system, heavily regulating firms in order to 
abolish private governments, restricts individuals’ negative freedom much more than the 
second system. Now, the presumption of formal freedom requires choosing the second system 
because it avoids unnecessary legal restrictions. 
c. Democratic reforms within firms may not be necessary to improve the 
distribution of overall freedom. Anderson only succeeds at demonstrating that authoritarian 
hierarchies in workplaces cannot be justified merely on the libertarian ground that they result 
from free contracts on the market. Her demonstration that there is authority in workplaces and 
that workers’ freedom of exit is limited is persuasive (37-41, 48-61). However, this is not 
sufficient to justify ambitious democratic reforms within firms since there may be alternative, 
less interventionist ways to promote workers’ overall freedom.  
Moreover, democratic states could justify tolerating firms’ private governments on 
other grounds. As Niko Kolodny notes at the end of his comment, workplace governance may 
not be directly accountable to workers but it is subjected to state governments which are 
accountable to all citizens (107). Therefore, if state governments representing all citizens 
judge that, all things considered, tolerating firms’ private government is acceptable, this could 
legitimise unaccountable authority within firms. Gregory Dow expresses this intuition very 
clearly: ‘there  might  be  good  reasons  for  withholding  control  rights  even  when workers 
do want them. The interest of society as a whole may demand that other goals take priority, 
perhaps including efficiency goals’ (2003: 42). For instance, a system tolerating firms’ private 
governments may be more efficient and therefore improve states’ revenue and their capacity 
to maximise the positive freedom of the least advantaged. In order to justify some of the most 
ambitious democratic reforms that Anderson envisions such as (4.) securing democratic 
representation in workplaces, she needs to demonstrate that these more interventionist reforms 
are absolutely necessary to improve the distribution of overall freedom.  
d. These democratic reforms cannot be justified on relational egalitarian grounds. 
Indeed, Anderson could deny that alternative policies – such as redistributive taxation, 
support to unions, and investments in social services – would succeed at realising a just 
society by arguing that authoritarian hierarchies would still create unequal relations. She 
famously argued that ‘the point of equality’ is not merely that resources or opportunities 
should be fairly distributed but that persons should stand as equals: ‘Egalitarians seek a social 
order in which persons stand in relations of equality. They seek to live together in a 
democratic community, as opposed to a hierarchical one’ (1999: 313-314). 
One problem with this view is that, in a pluralistic society, public authorities should 
arguably refrain from making moral judgments about people’s relations. They should not 
reject all forms of unaccountable authority on the mere ground that they create unequal 
relations. Indeed, even if this is not true for everyone, at least some people may reasonably 
prefer to work in authoritarian structures in exchange for other benefits such as higher wages, 
more flexible schedules, less responsibility and less risk. In his comment, Tyler Cowen may 
be overly optimistic about the quality of working conditions in modern corporations. Yet, he 
is right in claiming that some workers can prefer working for an authoritarian firm – thus 
sacrificing some republican freedom – in exchange for other benefits (108-116). One 
advantage of a distributive conception of justice – at least a resourcist one focusing on 
distributing polyvalent means to improve overall freedom – is that it refrains from making 
perfectionist moral judgments about the nature of social relations within organisations. In this 
view, if public authorities succeed at distributing overall freedom fairly by other means, there 
may be no need for democratic reforms within economic organisations, especially if they 
unnecessarily restrict negative freedom. 
To conclude, Anderson succeeds at refuting the libertarian beliefs that freedom and 
free markets always go hand in hand and that authoritarian hierarchies can be justified on the 
ground that they result from free market contracts, but she does not succeed at justifying all 
the strategies that she envisions to free workers from firms’ unaccountable authority.   
Strategies (1.), (2.), and (3.) may be easier to justify. First, states could improve 
workers’ freedom of exit by removing legal barriers to exit or by reducing exit costs (65) (a 
universal basic income could be one way to do so). This does not reduce the formal freedom 
of employers in any way and it improves workers’ power to negotiate better working 
conditions. Second, states could limit employers’ arbitrary power by imposing something 
similar to the rule of law in states. She argues that asking employers to respect due process 
before firing or sanctioning workers and giving workers recourse to contest decisions (which 
is often already the case) would not raise excessive obstacles to firms’ normal operations (66-
68). Third, a ‘workers’ bill of rights’ may be necessary to protect workers from the most 
extreme infringements on their political rights such as privacy and speech (within and outside 
the firm), from sanctions for off-duty behaviour, and from discrimination on grounds 
irrelevant to the performance of their job. Similar rights are protected in many countries (68). 
However, demonstrating that strategy (4.), requiring worker participation in 
governance at the firm level (69), is necessary to improve the distribution of overall freedom 
is much more difficult. This would require a thorough demonstration that alternative policies 
do not succeed at promoting workers’ overall freedom, and that policies promoting 
democratic workplaces would succeed at doing so without causing important economic costs. 
Private Government is a powerful and insightful book worth reading for any scholar 
and citizen concerned about domination in the workplace. Underlining unanswered objections 
does not aim at undermining the importance of this book. My aim is merely to encourage the 
quest for compelling arguments able to convince our fellow citizens to join this long but 
necessary journey towards economic democracy.  
 
Thomas Ferretti 
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